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Oh incompetence! My dreams never seem to engender the creature I so hunger for. The 
tiger does appear, but it is all dried up, or it’s flimsy-looking, or it has impure vagaries 
of shape or an unacceptable size, or it’s altogether too ephemeral, or it looks more like a 
dog or bird than like a tiger. (Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Dreamtigers’, 294.) 
 
What is it for an idea to be of something, a tiger say, and yet neither resemble a 
tiger nor represent it as it is? What would make it the idea it is, namely, the idea of 
a tiger? Answering this question on behalf of Descartes would, I think, tell us 
much about how he understood the relationship between the mind and its objects. 
It would also tell us much about how he conceived of the relationship between the 
knower and the known. 
There is a certain picture of Descartes’ theory of ideas which is standard and 
which I would like to join the challenge against. It has been challenged before by 
Brian O’Neili Calvin Normoreii and Lilli Alaneniii among othersiv and much of 
what I have to say is an extension of their ideas. The picture we all reject is this 
one: Rather than securing a firm foundation for knowledge, Descartes erects be-
tween the knower and the known a “veil of ideas” or intermediate objects of 
thought and perception. Barry Stroud paints the picture aptly when he describes 
Descartes’ sceptical conclusion in the First Meditation  
 
...as implying that we are permanently sealed off from a world we can never reach. We 
are restricted to the passing show on the veil of perception, with no possibility of ex-
tending our knowledge to the world beyond. We are confined to appearances we can 
never know to match or deviate from the imperceptible reality that is forever denied us.v
 
This way of framing the problem invites a number of cheap responses and dis-
counts Descartes’ own anti-sceptical arguments. Stroud’s targets are the cheap re-
sponses: the attempts “to minimize the seriousness of the predicament, to try to 
settle for what is undeniably available to us, or perhaps even to argue that nothing 
that concerns us or makes human life worthwhile has been left out.”vi But few who 
take seriously the sceptical challenge would also take seriously Descartes’ claims 
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in the Second Meditation to have found a paradigm of certainty in the idea of the 
self. No amount of attention to the “internal marks” of indubitability in an idea, 
clarity and distinctness, can, in the words of one scholar, address the “fatal objec-
tion” that the possession of an idea does not in itself justify our claims to know 
about such matters as the existence of God and the nature of substance.vii
What is evident from such objections is the assumption that at the end of the 
day Descartes is a representational realist. Although there may be variations on any 
theme, one way to characterize the representational realist is as one who holds to 
the following three propositions: 
 
(I) The only immediate objects of knowledge are the mind’s ideas or internal 
states (concepts or percepts). 
(II) The mind knows indubitably  its own ideas or internal states.viii
(III) Knowledge of extramental reality depends on a inference from knowledge 
claims about the content of one’s ideas to claims about what those ideas purport 
to represent.ix
 
On the representationalist reading Descartes is seen as subscribing to these basic 
tenets of representationalism. He is thus regarded as having regressed away from 
the direct realism of those Scholastics who, like Aquinas, espoused a non-
inferential immediate awareness of extramental natures. I suspect that there is very 
little evidence to support the reading of Descartes as a representationalist. In fact, 
there is very little reason to believe that Descartes subscribed to these three propo-
sitions in their present form or, if he did, that his endorsement supports a reading of 
him as a representational realist. 
I shall not here attempt to evaluate the success of Descartes’ arguments against 
skepticism—that is well beyond the scope of this paper. My concern is with the 
form of his theory of our epistemic access to the world. The charge that Descartes 
is a representational realist has (at least) two sources: the Demon thought experi-
ment and Descartes’ representational theory of mind. Although my concern is pri-
marily with the latter, what I have to say about it bears on the former. The Demon 
hypothesis seems to support the interpretation of Descartes as a representationalist 
insofar as it is construed in the following way. Descartes appears to present two 
possible worlds: the Demon world in which all our ideas of the external world mis-
represent it (either by representing it as existing when it doesn’t or by representing 
it as other than it is) and the world Descartes sees himself as proving is the actual 
one, a world in which at least an important subset of our ideas, upon critical reflec-
tion, can be known to correspond to the way things are. What is important for this 
reading of Descartes is that in both scenarios the ideas are the same. Thus what we 
know directly in either scenario is the same—namely, ideas - and the task for the 
meditator is to figure out what can be inferred from those ideas about the external 
world. That the Demon hypothesis supports a representationalist reading of Des-
cartes thus depends on a certain view of Cartesian ideas as being objects the iden-
tity of which is independent of the way the world actually is. 
But to draw any conclusions from the Demon hypothesis about the kind of real-
ism to which Descartes subscribes, one has first to establish that there is a logical 
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connection between representationalism as a theory of mind and representational-
ism as a theory of knowledge. The representational theory of mind is generally 
understood as defining thought as the processing of symbols or mental representa-
tions - that is, as involving some kind of commitment to realism about mental rep-
resentations. That is a description sufficient to distinguish representationalism from 
behaviorism and eliminativism but leaves it an open question precisely what the 
nature of thought is—i.e., whether it is best understood by analogy with language 
or on some other model is up for grabs. It is also a further question whether the 
representational theory of mind entails representational realism. If there is an en-
tailment between the two theories then those who believe that Scholastics like 
Aquinas are direct realists are in trouble for the Scholastics were as much commit-
ted to the representational theory of mind as Descartes was. Paul Hoffman has for 
this reason recently suggested that Aquinas might also be a representational real-
ist.x The fact that, according to Aquinas, “the intelligible species is not that what is 
understood, but that by which the intellect understands”xi does not rule out, on a 
reading such as Hoffman’s, that the intellect knows the natures of material things 
by first cognizing their likenesses (similitudines).xii
But why think that representationalism about the mind does entail a representa-
tionalist epistemology? Let us look at the question from the other direction. What 
exactly is it about the representational theory of mind that seems to conflict with 
direct realism? One likely answer is that the link is forged by a certain picture of 
what ideas are. Descartes follows a tradition of thought which characterises inten-
tionality in terms of the objective existence of things. On this picture there are what 
we might refer to loosely as two modes of being: the being of a thing as repre-
sented by the mind (objective being) and the non-representational being something 
has as either a mode or a substance (formal being). It is the objective being of ideas 
which, Descartes claims in the Third Meditation, accounts for the content of ideas 
and thus distinguishes one from the other: 
 
In so far as ideas are simply modes of thinking, there is no recognizable inequality 
among them and all appear to proceed from me in the same way. But in so far as one 
represents one thing, another another thing, it is clear that they differ from each other 
greatly. (AT VII, 40.) 
 
My question is whether this picture of representation is incompatible with direct 
realism. An incompatibilist might reason thus: On the objective existence theory, 
thought is a relation between the thinker and things which have objective being in 
the mind. The mind is only directly aware of things which appear on its private 
stage; thoughts about extramental objects are thus mediated by inference from 
thoughts about objective existents. But this shows us that the link between repre-
sentationalism as a theory of mind and representationalism as a theory of knowl-
edge is mediated by a certain understanding of the former. It is not really represen-
tationalism per se which compromises direct realism but objective existence ver-
sions of it in conjunction with the idea that what the mind knows primarily and 
indubitably are only things with objective reality. 
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We are now at the heart of the matter. It is supposedly objective existence ver-
sions of the representational theory of mind which are incompatible with direct 
realism. It is my view that there is nothing inherent in an objective existence ver-
sion of the representational theory of mind, provided it is understood a certain way, 
that entails representational realism. To get our bearings on this topic it will be 
useful to take a short detour through the major accounts of objective reality in the 
middle ages. 
 
 
Esse Objectivum Before Descartes 
 
The history of the notion of objective being has been canvassed by others and I do 
not propose to repeat the story here.xiii My purpose is to draw attention simply to 
those aspects of the tradition prior to Descartes which test the credibility of a nec-
essary conceptual link between the theory of objective existence and representa-
tional realism.  
The concept of esse obiectivum figured in debates about the objects of visual il-
lusions and in debates over the status of universals during the middle ages. On so-
called “perspectivist” theories such as Alhazen’s, Roger Bacon’s and Peter 
Aureol’s when one is subject to a sensory illusion what is perceived is something 
with “diminished”, “apparent” or “objective” being. The following example from 
Aureol illustrates nicely one problem objective being was intended to solve. 
 
When one is carried on the water, the trees existing on the shore appear to move. This 
motion, therefore, which is objectively in the eye (in oculo obiective) cannot be posited 
to be vision itself; otherwise vision would be the object seen, and a vision would have 
been seen, and vision would be a reflective power. Nor can it be posited to be really in 
the trees or in the shore, because then they would really have moved. Nor can it be pos-
ited to be in the air because it is not attributed to the air but to the trees. Therefore, it is 
only intentionally (tantum intentionaliter), not really, in seen being and in judged being. 
xiv
 
Aureol reasons thus: Since the motion which is seen cannot reside in the trees 
themselves, nor the air, nor do we perceive what takes place in the eyes, it must 
reside in something else: esse viso iudicato et apparenti.  
In contemporary theories of perception, visual illusions have provided the best 
argument for representational realism. If your awareness is the same in both cases 
of veridical and non-veridical perception, then, so the argument goes, what you 
must be aware of in both cases is the same. It follows that in the normal (i.e., 
veridical) case what you are aware of is the sensory state itself or sense data. I 
doubt that this argument would have persuaded many philosophers of the middle 
ages. Objective entia were not the percepts or concepts or properties of these things 
but objects, albeit with diminished, apparent, judged or objective being. For per-
spectivists such a Aureol they had a kind of “third realm” status: neither mind-
independent extramental objects nor intramental objects. From an ontological per-
spective positing objective beings incurs no greater cost in terms of additional be-
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ings than sense data views. There is no obvious reason to favour (and perhaps 
every reason to avoid) the idea that what I see when I see a bent stick in water and 
what I see when I see a stick which is really bent are properties of the mental or 
visual event itself over the idea that what I see are two different orders of object. 
The latter idea at least has all the advantages of being compatible with direct real-
ism. 
What then of the argument that universals are objective entia? Although the no-
tion of objective being was not confined to nominalist theories (some argued that 
universals had subjective being in singulars and objective being as objects of 
thought) it was enormously convenient for nominalists who wanted to avail them-
selves of universals to account for general thought without admitting them into the 
ontology in any serious way. In Ockham’s early works, a universal is a fictum—
“that which immediately terminates the act of thinking when no singular thing is 
thought of.”xv When I think abstractly of the kind horse without thinking of any 
particular horse what I think of is neither a quality of mind nor something with 
formal being but something with objective being.xvi
Is there anything in this picture which compromises direct realism? Certainly, 
critics of the nominalist view such as Walter Chatton thought so. Chatton argued 
that things with objective being must be either really distinct from mental acts or 
not. If not, then for every thought of the same type there is a distinct fictum, which 
is a violation of Ockham’s razor. If, however, an act and its fictum are really dis-
tinct then the one can exist without the other “but then there would be objective 
and intellective being without any intellection, which is a plain contradiction.”xvii
Immunity against this argument could have been bought, as it seems to have 
been by Aureol, but only at the cost of admitting objective beings to a third realm. 
For one could just as easily come down on the side of the object rather than the 
mental act at this point. How objective beings could be mind-dependent yet neither 
qualities of the mind nor of extramental reality is a mystery to be sure but not ob-
viously contradictory. Alternatively, one could accept the identity of act and object 
but still find some use for thinking of mental acts in objective terms, that is, as de-
fined by the directedness of the act towards an object.  In any event, there is noth-
ing essentially representationalist about this theory of universals. Ficta are not 
mental representations which are known prior to singulars but objects acquired 
through the same process in which singulars are known and through which singu-
lars are known in a certain way.  Persuaded by his confrere’s arguments, Ockham, 
however, abandoned the concept of ficta altogether and the act-object distinction it 
seemed to presuppose. In the later intellectio or act-only theory, the process of ac-
quiring a general concept by abstraction from the concept for a particular human is 
described thus: 
 
First a human is apprehended (cognoscitur) by some particular sense, then that same 
human is apprehended by the intellect and when (the human being) has been conceived, 
a general notion common to all humans is formed. This apprehension (cognitio) is called 
a concept, intention or passion which is a common concept to all humans and when it 
exists in the intellect, the intellect immediately knows that a human is something with-
out any process of reasoning (sine discursu).xviii
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What is lost when one gives up the concept of objective existence? Not much 
on Ockham’s account and to some extent I am inclined to agree. But there is some-
thing unsatisfying about the act-only theory of representation akin to what has 
struck some philosophers as so deeply unsatisfying about causal theories of refer-
ence. It is hard to give up the intuition that ideas don’t merely represent their 
causes. Borges’ idea represents the tiger as more like a bird or as having impure 
vagaries of shape or as having an unacceptable size. The attempt to build these 
features of ideas into the description of the act—the bizarre constructions of adver-
bial theories (e.g., thinking-tiger-as-a-bird-ly)—is clumsy and has little economical 
advantage over retaining objects of thought. Act-only theories also do little to re-
duce the unease produced by thinking that in our first encounters with objects we 
cannot be in error. On Ockham’s later view, our first experience of a tiger should 
be sufficient for acquiring the concept of a tiger regardless of whatever dreamlike 
qualities it may be infected with.  
Which brings me to Aquinas, the last stop in this all-too-brief tour of the his-
tory of esse obiectivum and an odd place to stop since Aquinas, to my knowledge, 
never used the terminology nor, in using the notion of intelligible species, had in 
mind anything like Ockham’s ficta or Aureol’s apparent beings. It might seem 
more natural to stop the tour with Suarez, the one whose doctrine of objective be-
ing Caterus had in mind when he objected to Descartes that he was unjustifiably 
reifying the notion of objective being in his proof of God’s existence. (AT VII, 92-
3.) But Descartes’ own view has less in common with Suarez’ than Aquinas’ doc-
trine of intelligible species for Suarez thinks of objective being as simply a way of 
talking about extramental objects insofar as they are thought about or “denomi-
nated” (esse cognitum quoad denominationem)xix whereas Descartes makes it clear 
in his reply to Caterus that objective being is for him being “in the intellect in the 
way objects usually are there.” (AT VII, 102.) Unlike Suarez, moreover, Aquinas 
has a role to play in explaining our contemporary use of the notion of intentional 
object through his influence on Brentano although this too is a peculiar piece of 
philosophical history.xx Brentano himself denied that the intentional “in-existence” 
of objects, as he put it, was anything but a way of speaking synsemantically, [mit-
bedeutende] about the thinker thinking and carried no ontological weight.xxi Aqui-
nas is important for our purposes, however, as an example of someone who pro-
fesses direct realism but who also subscribes to two modes of being of objects. 
What are Aquinas’ objects of thought if not objective entia? They are intelligi-
ble species or the forms of extramental objects. The account of concept acquisition 
begins with the acquisition of sensible species, the accidental forms of external 
objects received in a spiritual mode into the matter of the sense organs. Species 
thus reach the intellect through increasing levels of abstraction: first from the mat-
ter of their original objects, then from the matter of the sense organs. By means of 
this process, the mind has puportedly direct access to the natures of material things 
because the species just are the forms of extramental things existing in a spiritual 
or intentional mode of being in the human soul. It is the formal identity of the spe-
cies both within and outside the mind which is supposed to save the account from a 
representationalist epistemology. 
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At least this was the hope. Hoffman has raised doubts about the rights of Tho-
mas to draw this conclusion and before Hoffman, A. Boyce Gibson put a similar 
objection delightfully thus: 
 
The medieval theory of perception was realistic; the senses are the open gates thronged 
by the ‘species’ which emanate by effluence from the actual object, and passing into the 
mind nevertheless remain what they were outside it. But if perception is representative, 
the external world, on its entrance to the mind, passes, as it were, through a toll-gate of 
unreality, and its bewildered ghost wanders about its new home, for ever doubtful of its 
own identity.xxii
 
The bewildered ghosts or species of material objects are the source of the doubt 
that Aquinas is a direct realist. The intellect is aware primarily of its own states or 
how it is modified (by these natures in a spiritual and universal mode) and not of 
how these natures are in the world, namely as individualized forms of matter. 
Hoffman thinks that the very fact that the mind is able to know external natures 
because the intelligible species resembles extramental objects is indicative of a 
representationalist strand in Aquinas’ realism.xxiii But resemblance is not a primi-
tive concept in the theory but one analysed in terms of the formal identity of spe-
cies and external objects and there is no suggestion in Aquinas’ account that one 
must first establish that the resemblance holds in order to know external natures. 
The success of the theory depends on the formal identity of the intelligible species 
and the forms of external things, an idea that taxes the modern mind too highly, but 
which does not on that account make the theory a form of representational realism. 
No inference from knowledge of intelligible species to extramental natures is sug-
gested or required by the theory. 
An inference is however required in obtaining knowledge of particular things 
on Aquinas’ account.  Singular knowledge is indirect and inferential. 
 
In this way, therefore, (the intellect) understands the universal itself directly through an 
intelligible species; it understands singulars however indirectly, of which there are phan-
tasms.xxiv
 
Aquinas’ treatment of singular knowledge is fraught with difficulty. The intellect 
trades in universals. Knowledge of singulars is relegated to the province of the 
senses. The intellect must “revert to the phantasms” (convertendo se ad phantas-
mata ) to be said to know singulars. Strictly speaking, the senses do not know any-
thing. At De Veritate I, q.2.6, Aquinas asserts that it is the whole human being who 
knows singulars, not the intellect and not the senses. How the whole human being 
can be said to know that which no part of it knows is not, however, further clari-
fied. In this domain there is direct perception by the senses but not direct knowl-
edge and all because of what seems to be an excessive attachment to the generality 
of thought hypothesis. The fact that we do not know directly individual things or 
matter (hence not the whole of extramental reality) does not, however, detract from 
the claim that the mind knows directly the natures of external things. After all, they 
are in some sense the same thing as intelligible species.  
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Objective reality or perfection in Descartes. 
 
What, besides the terminology, does Descartes’ notion of objective being have in 
common with the notion as it appears in these traditions? Descartes rejects the no-
tions of substantial forms and species in either the medium or the mind. Rather 
than conflating concepts with species, Descartes adopts the Platonic terminology of 
‘ideas’ but, as he is commonly understood, drops the association between ideas and 
‘exemplars’, copies of the Divine ideas, or models for creation. Descartes’ ideas 
are dependent upon their causes both for their formal reality and, importantly for 
our purposes, their content. (AT VII, 41-2.) 
Descartes also modifies the long-standing assumption that ideas represent by 
virtue of being similar to what they represent. Aquinas’ insistence that species are 
likenesses (similitudines) of external things may not be sufficient to make him a 
representational realist but it certainly compromises his realism. If relations of 
similarity are to be understood in terms of shared properties of the relata, it is diffi-
cult to see what properties material objects could share with their “bewildered 
ghosts” in an dematerialized intellect. Moreover, as Descartes points out in connec-
tion with his discussion of the two ideas of the sun, there is often a great disparity 
between the idea and its object. The idea of the sun which emanates more directly 
from the sun itself and, one would think, puts us more directly in contact with the 
sun, the idea of the sun as a small yellow disk, is the one which bears the least re-
semblance to its object. (AT VII, 39.) It is possible, therefore, on Descartes’ ac-
count, to have an idea which bears little, if any, resemblance to that of which it is 
an idea. It is also possible to have contradictory ideas of the same thing, both of 
which cannot be of the thing by virtue of resembling it. (AT VII, 39.) Descartes’ 
account of objective being commits him only to the claim that things can have two 
modes of being, formal and objective, to the identity of the object outside the intel-
lect and inside it. There is nothing in his use of this notion which commits him to 
the claim that ideas must resemble that of which they are ideas or that ideas and 
their formally existing objects have any properties in common. 
Descartes tells us instead at the beginning of the Third Meditation that ideas are 
‘just as if certain images of things’ (veluti quasdam imagines) which may not seem 
to advance the debate much at all. (AT VII, 42; also, 36-7.) Are not images (at 
least in his time) representational by virtue of resembling their res representata? 
This is certainly how Descartes is often interpreted: as arguing that there is both a 
causal or referential and a resemblance or nonreferential constraint on true repre-
sentation. I doubt that this is his point in stating that ideas are ‘as if images’ of 
things. Descartes refers to his habit of judging that the ideas he finds within him-
self resemble reality to be the greatest source of his previous errors. (AT VII, 37.) 
When he later reintroduces the analogy between ideas and images, rather than rely-
ing on any claims about the power of images to resemble reality his point seems 
more to establish that ideas are like images or copies in the sense of not being able 
to have a greater degree of perfection than their causes. (AT VII, 42.) 
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Thus it is clear to me, by the natural light, that the ideas in me are like images which can 
easily fall short of the perfection of the things from which they are taken, but which 
cannot contain anything greater or more perfect. (AT VII, 42; CSM II, 29.) 
 
The picture analogy serves to make, however, one useful point. The representa-
tionality of an idea cannot be reduced to the formal or “subjective” properties of 
the idea - the properties an idea has by virtue of being a mode of mind any more 
than, as Descartes explains to Regius, one could expect to paint pictures like 
Apelles by arranging patterns of paint on a canvas in the same way as Apelles. 
(June, 1642; AT III, 566-7.) The problem of representation Descartes is sketching 
here would not go away with a materialist theory of mind, a point with which 
many contemporary externalists about mental content concur. 
Denying that Descartes’ theory of ideas is in any straightforward way a resem-
blance theory is not to say that there is no nonreferential component to ideas  as 
Calvin Normore has pointed out.xxv Indeed, ideas could not provide occasions for 
error if they did not present their objects in certain ways. It is this aspect of ideas 
which Margaret Wilson, careful to avoid resemblance talk in her early discussion 
of the notion of objective reality, designated the “representational character” of 
Cartesian ideas.xxvi Although this notion only shifts the question of how to under-
stand the notion of representation for Descartes to the question of how to under-
stand the notion of “representational character,” Wilson is right to have marked it 
as distinct from the notion of resemblance. Wilson’s representational character is 
close to what I think of as the nonreferential component of ideas but whereas for 
her the representational character of an idea is distinct from the objective reality of 
the idea, and hence an “embarassment” for Descartes, for me the nonreferential 
component is a component of objective reality.xxvii I shall return to this point below 
in discussing the notion of ‘material falsity.’ 
As Descartes explains perhaps unhelpfully in the Replies to the First Objec-
tions, the objective being of ideas “signifies nothing other than being in the intel-
lect in the way in which objects usually exist in the intellect” (AT VII, 102.) The 
distinction between formal and objective being was not new but what does seem to 
be new is Descartes’ further claim that both the formal and objective aspects of 
ideas need a cause. 
 
For if we suppose that something is discovered in an idea which cannot be in its cause, it 
must therefore have this from nothing; nevertheless, however much imperfection is in 
that mode of being, by which the thing exists objectively in the intellect through the 
idea, plainly it is not really nothing, nor consequently can it exist from nothing. (AT VII, 
41.) 
 
The causal principle Descartes uses to argue for the existence of God is an exten-
sion of the Scholastic principle that there cannot be more reality in an effect than is 
contained formally or eminently in its cause. For Descartes an idea can have less 
objective reality than its cause has formal reality but it cannot have more which is 
why the idea of an intricate machine cannot have been caused by anything less 
than a machine with that much intricacy formally or a knowledge of engineering. 
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(AT VII, 103-4.) The distinction between formal and eminent containment can be 
characterized in the following way. If an idea, A, represents an object X as F, then 
either F-ness is contained formally in its cause or, if the cause of A’s representing 
X as F does not contain F formally, it must have a greater degree of reality than the 
content of A. It might be thought that eminent containment is added to account 
only for the idea of God. Since God has no modes it cannot be that God has for-
mally what our idea of God contains objectively. But eminent containment may 
also be useful to explain ideas which misrepresent their objects. For example, our 
non-astronomical idea of the sun contains features which are not contained for-
mally in the sun but the sun has a greater degree of formal reality than this idea has 
objective reality and so can be its cause. 
The referential component of an idea is given by the identity of the object exist-
ing objectively in the intellect, as either an essence or nature, for example, triangu-
larity, or an existing particular such as the sun (AT III, 350). How then are we to 
understand the non-referential component of objective being in Descartes? Calvin 
Normore and I have recently argued in relation to Descartes’ account of the pas-
sions and sensations that Descartes’ notion of representation is primarily represen-
tation as.xxviii I want to suggest here that the objective being of a thing should not 
merely be thought of as the thing itself but as the thing under a certain mode of 
presentation (though I am not suggesting in addition the Fregean ideas that the 
mode of presentation is really distinct from the idea of the object or that it deter-
mines the reference of an idea). Hence, in the case of the two ideas of the sun, both 
are ideas of the sun but they differ in how the sun is objectively presented in each 
idea. 
It follows from this view that there can be difference in the objective reality of 
ideas which is not a difference in the identity of the object represented. Descartes 
says as much himself in the letter to *** (1645 or 1646) when he writes that a 
thought of the essence of a triangle, and a thought about the existence of the same 
triangle  “even understood objectively differ modally in the strict sense of the term 
‘mode.’” even though the essence and existence of the triangle itself are not dis-
tinct. (AT III, 350.) Notice that on Wilson’s view these are not differences in the 
objective reality of ideas but a difference between their representational characters. 
Why does Wilson argue for this distinction and why do I want to resist it? 
Wilson proposes that it is necessary to separate the representational character 
and objective reality of ideas in order to make sense of Descartes’ claims about 
“materially false” ideas. When an idea is confused and obscure it can provide ma-
terial for error to an unwary mind by representing “non-things as things.” For ex-
ample, it is impossible to tell from our idea of cold whether cold is a positive entity 
or merely the absence of heat. (AT VII, 43-4.) The problem with this claim, as Ar-
nauld rightly observed, is that Descartes’ very theory of representation would seem 
to require that what is conceived must be some thing, if only an objectively exist-
ing thing. To Arnauld’s objection that if cold is a privation it can no more exist 
objectively in the mind than formally exist, Descartes replies somewhat obscurely: 
 
I think that a distinction is necessary: for it often happens in confused and obscure ideas, 
among which those of heat and cold are numbered, that they are referred to a thing other 
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than that of which they are ideas. Thus, if cold is only a privation, the idea of cold is not 
cold itself, as it were objectively in the intellect, but another thing which I take wrongly 
for that privation; truly, it is a sensation which has no being outside the intellect. (AT 
VII, 233.) 
 
Wilson takes Descartes’ notion of material falsity point to be incompatible with the 
claim that materially false sensations have objective being.xxix In so far as sensa-
tions are representations their intentionality and distinctiveness should be due to 
some other feature, which Wilson labels their representational character. 
I used to hold something like this myself but I now think that it is deeply mis-
taken. For one thing, it would make Descartes’ texts stupidly inconsistent. (I’m 
prepared to admit they may be inconsistent but not stupidly so.) The objective 
mode of being is not an inessential feature but belongs, Descartes writes, to ideas 
“by their very nature.” (AT VII, 42.) There is, moreover, a problem regarding the 
two ideas of the sun on Wilson’s reading. The two ideas of the sun would have the 
same objective being but differ in representational character. Here Wilson’s view 
implies that if ideas were just characterized by their objective being, these two 
ideas would be indistinguishable. But this is precisely the mistake Descartes ac-
cused Gassendi of when he, Descartes, complained that two ideas are not the same 
for having the same subject. (AT VII, 363.) It is not at all obvious that he would 
have regarded the two ideas of the sun as having the same objective reality simply 
because they each contain the same thing objectively. Lastly, and perhaps most 
importantly for our purposes, if Wilson is right, then Descartes’ theory of represen-
tation would run perilously close to entailing representational realism. For Wil-
son’s representational character of an idea does seem to work like a Fregean mode 
of presentation in fixing reference by whatever fits the representational character of 
the idea (or not as in the case of materially false ideas) and in being that which one 
has primary epistemic access to. Since the representational character determines 
the content of a materially false idea, not its objective reality, what else could it 
represent than whatever resembles the representational character of the idea? 
Hence, Wilson argues, the whole account is deeply embarrassing because it raises 
an obvious objection to Descartes’ proof of the existence of God in that: 
 
...it entails that the objective reality of an idea is not something the idea wears on its 
face. Descartes would have it otherwise: in his initial exposition of the concept of objec-
tive reality he seems to indicate that an idea’s objective reality is transparent, deriving 
directly from its representative character...xxx
 
But if the content of an idea is determined by its representational character, Des-
cartes could not claim that the two ideas of the sun were ideas of the same thing. 
The actual sun fits the representational character of the astronomical idea; the ref-
erent of the other idea should, if any such thing exists, be some yellow disk the size 
of a coin.xxxi
None of this rules out the possibility that Wilson is right and Descartes’ ac-
count is simply incoherent. We should not underestimate the difficulty of reconcil-
ing Descartes’ remarks about material falsity with his objective existence theory of 
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content. But I think we can read the exchange with Arnauld in a way that does not 
compromise his theory of objective being or his direct realism. In the passage 
where Descartes replies that the mind mistakes a sensation for cold, Descartes 
seems to be suggesting that it is the sensation itself which is objectively present in 
the idea of cold. What if the mode of presentation of the sensation were presenting 
not the features properly predicable of a sensation but features properly predicable, 
if they exist, of bodies? If there are no such corresponding features of body—for 
example, if cold is a privation—then the mode of presentation of the sensation will 
represent a non-thing as a thing. It cannot be that cold is a feature of the objective 
reality of the idea for the reasons Arnauld gives—if cold were a feature of the ob-
jective reality of the idea, then it would have some degree of being and so cold 
would not be a privation and the idea of cold would not be false. But it can be a 
feature of the objective reality of a sensation that it is presented as a mode of body 
or, in Descartes’ terminology, is “referred” to some external body, and then from 
an intentional perspective it will represent bodies as having some property as much 
as if the corresponding property of bodies did exist and was objectively present in 
the idea.xxxii This reading is different from standard projectionist accounts since the 
claim is not that either a sensation or a feature of sensation, coldness, is projected 
by the mind onto bodies. The point is rather that it is part of the mode of presenta-
tion of materially false sensations that they are appear as modes of body and thus 
are necessarily false.xxxiii This mode of presentation of the idea of cold, like the 
false idea of the sun, is, however, nothing distinct from the objective reality of the 
idea. 
In what sense, then, does a materially false idea represent a non-thing as a 
thing? Since a sensation is something positive, the account just given suggests that 
materially false sensations represent some thing as it is not rather than a non-thing 
as a thing. But I think the latter is just a way of thinking of the representational 
relation involved in material falsity from the point of view of the object rather than 
from the point of view of the perceiver. By representing a sensation as a mode of 
the body, at the same time and by the same process, we represent bodies as having 
modes that they of metaphysical necessity lack.xxxiv
Descartes’ general view of sensation is that because the mind is aware of its 
sensations and because sensations present as they do that it is natural to refer them 
to external objects. The notion of “referring” introduced in the replies to Arnauld is 
thus crucial to Descartes’ theory of perceptual representation. Some ideas spring 
from one source (e.g., the body) and are referred to another. In Les Passions de 
l’Ame, this idea becomes part of the very definition of passions and sensations.xxxv 
Pain is a mode of the soul but is predicated by the soul of some part of the body 
like the foot or the hand; a sensation of green is referred to the grass and anger to 
the soul but all are caused by proximal movements of the animal spirits and pineal 
gland (aa.22-9). What one is aware of when an idea is false is not some intermedi-
ate object but the sensation itself, on account of the nature of which or the way it 
presents itelf, one refers it outside the mind. Referring, however, is not inferring . 
One does not know first some feature of the sensation and then infer to some prop-
erty of bodies; if one knew that much, the idea would not be false. But this picture 
raises some sceptical concerns. Our referring our sensations outside the mind does 
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not entail the existence of anything outside the mind. But this is, for Descartes 
unlike the Scholastics, what we should expect for the answer to the sceptic is not 
going to be given simply from within the theory of perception alone. 
 
When we look, therefore, for a cause of the objective reality of a sensory idea, we need 
look no further than human nature or the union of mind and body. For if a sensory idea 
is false it stems from an imperfection in my nature and, if it is true and the reality it pre-
sents is indistinguishable from a non-thing, in either case I would be right to conclude 
that the idea originates wholly from within me. (AT VII, 44.) 
 
 
Descartes as a Direct Realist 
 
Is there anything in Descartes’ account of objective existence and material falsity 
which commits him to representational realism? Let us begin by re-examining the 
evidence in favour of three central tenets of representationalism. 
First: Are the immediate objects of awareness ideas rather than things our ideas 
are about? It is true that Descartes sometimes uses representationalist language: 
“...I understand by the term idea that form of any given thought through the imme-
diate perception of which I am conscious of that very thought.” (AT VII, 160.) But 
given Descartes’ commitment to the objective reality of ideas as determining the 
representational content of ideas, being immediately aware of one’s ideas is not 
incompatible with being aware directly of external objects, for the objective reality 
and the formal reality of the object are not really distinct. 
The second tenet—that the mind knows indubitably its ideas—seems unconten-
tious but even this proposition has to be modified in light of the discussion of ma-
terial falsity. What I know indubitably is the formal reality of my sensory ideas—
that I am experiencing a pain, a desire, a fit of pique—but uncovering the objective 
reality of the idea may require some theory. (Principles, I, 45-6; AT VIIIa, 22.) In 
cases of material falsity what I am thinking of turns out to be nothing but the modi-
fication of mind which has been caused by some external process but then what I 
am conscious of directly is not merely the idea but also the object of the idea, al-
though not under that description. 
The third tenet is particularly important for determining whether Descartes is a 
representational realist or not. Does knowledge of extramental reality depend, ac-
cording to Descartes, on an inference from one’s knowledge of one’s own ideas? 
Here are three reasons why someone may be tempted to answer this last question 
affirmatively. First, Descartes’ method is to proceed from an examination of the 
attributes of ideas (clarity and distinctness) to judgements about the natures of 
things. The fourth postulate of the Geometrical Exposition of the arguments of the 
Meditations in the Second Set of Replies states: 
 
I ask that [the readers] examine the ideas of natures in which a complex of many attrib-
utes together is contained, such as the nature of a triangle, the nature of a square, or of 
other figures; likewise, the nature of mind, the nature of body, and above all the nature 
of God. And they should notice that all those things which we perceive to be contained 
in those ideas can be truly affirmed of those things. (AT VII, 163.) 
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Second, the method succeeds only because of these internal marks of the truth of 
ideas: clarity and distinctness. When an idea is both clear and distinct, that is, both 
present and accessible to the mind and so sharply distinguished from all other per-
ceptions that it contains within itself only what is clear, Descartes claims that it can 
serve as the basis for a certain and indubitable judgement. (AT VIIIA, 22.) A clear 
and distinct idea makes perspicuous the essential features and existence of an ob-
ject thereby distinguishing it from every other thing. 
Finally, it may be thought that Descartes’ use of the causal principle to secure 
knowledge of the causes of ideas introduces an inferential aspect to knowledge. 
 
We could not judge on the basis of this idea that the sky exists unless because every idea 
must have as the cause of its objective reality a really existing thing; which cause we 
judge [in this case] to be the sky itself... (AT VII, 165.) 
 
Is it not the case that Descartes uses the causal principle that an idea must have a 
cause which contains formally or eminently all the objective reality present in the 
idea to establish that certain features of an idea (those about which we have a clear 
and distinct perception) must be contained in the cause? (AT VII, 41.) And does he 
not also use it in the Sixth Meditation to defeat the supposition of the dreaming and 
Demon hypotheses that he is either alone in the world or stuck in very bad com-
pany? (AT VII, 79-80.) 
In my view, the above discussion of objective reality shows that these aspects 
of Descartes’ epistemology do not determine that the form of Descartes’ realism is 
representationalist. Descartes’ claim that an idea is what the mind perceives di-
rectly does not preclude its being true that what the mind thereby perceives directly 
is some true and immutable nature, triangularity, or an actual existing particular 
such as the piece of wax before him or the sun.  
 
When, for example, I imagine a triangle, even if perhaps a figure of no such kind exists 
outside my thought, or anywhere, there is nevertheless its determinate nature, or es-
sence, or form, immutable and eternal, which is not produced by me nor dependent upon 
my mind... (AT VII, 64.) 
 
We might say, therefore, that Descartes has something like a direct reference the-
ory of ideas: ideas represent directly the objects with which they are in some sense 
identical. But does the fact that Descartes on my reading holds that ideas represent 
objects as this or that require an inference to draw conclusions about the degree to 
which ideas correspond to reality? Cartesian ideas are clearly not the same as the 
“intuitive cognitions” of Scotus and Ockham: they require some kind of analysis or 
test (for clarity and distinctness) for us to be certain that they correspond to some 
thing which actually exists. It is true that Descartes’ method requires that we exam-
ine ideas for clarity and distinctness to determine whether they represent some be-
ing. Is it also part of our reasoning about the correspondence of ideas that we con-
sider the truth of the causal principle? 
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It is important to distinguish what in Descartes’ epistemology is part of the the-
ory of why we know what we know and what is part of the process of knowing 
what we know. The clarity and distinctness of an idea explains why we know what 
we know but entails nothing about whether what we know directly is some idea or 
some external object. When Descartes describes the process by which we come to 
assent to clear and distinct perceptions, there is no evidence of a gap between the 
perception and the assent to be bridged by an inference: 
 
And even if this is proved by no reason, it is impressed upon the minds of all by nature 
that whenever we perceive something clearly, we assent to it willingly, and in no way 
are able to doubt but that it is true. (AT VIIIA, 21.) 
 
Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas are thus in one way like Ockham’s intuitive 
cognitions: no further inference or reasoning is required to know that the idea cor-
responds to something .  
The causal principle is also part of the theory of why we know what we know. 
When Descartes rejects in the Second Replies that one knows that the sky exists 
because one ‘sees’ it and offers instead the justification that one knows the sky 
exists because seeing it affects the mind in such a way as to produce an idea which 
“must have a really existing cause of its objective reality” and “thus we judge that 
the cause is the sky itself” (AT VII, 165) he should not be read here as contrasting 
direct and representational realism and defending the latter over the former.  The 
sky existing in the intellect is the very sky that exists in the heavens so what one 
knows when one knows one’s idea just is the sky itself. The causal principle is 
required as part of the explanation of how one’s knowledge claims can be justified 
and is not proposed as a intermediary in the cognitive relationship between the 
knower and the known. 
We should, therefore, be wary of concluding that Descartes’ speaking of ideas 
as the basis for judgement commits him to anything like our third tenet of repre-
sentational realism. Being the basis for judgement does not mean that ideas are the 
basis for any inference from indubitably given internal objects to the existence of 
external objects and their properties. To return to our earlier question, it should 
also be clear that there is, therefore, no intrinsic connection between representa-
tionalism as a theory of mind and representational realism. If I am right about Des-
cartes’ account of objective being, the tendency to regard Descartes as a represen-
tational realist thus represents a significant misunderstanding of his theory of ideas 
as well as his epistemology.xxxvi
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Notes 
 
i  O’Neil (1974) directs our attention to the strong form of direct realism in the Regulae 
and the influence of Thomism throughout Descartes’ works despite his rejection of sub-
stantial forms. See also Kemp Smith (1952), 51-2, and Beck (1952), 72-4. 
ii  See Normore (1986). 
iii  See Alanen (1990). 
iv  See also Nadler (1989), Monte Cook (1987), Yolton (1975) and Lennon (1974). For a 
more sceptical attitude towards this trend towards reading Descartes as a direct realist, 
see Hoffman (2002). 
v  See Stroud (1984), 33-34. 
vi  Ibid., 34. 
vii  See Ashworth (1972), 105. See also Gibson (1932) on the “nemesis” of representative 
perception: “for if we know only through the medium of representative ideas, how do 
we know there is anything except ideas?” (79) 
viii  Perhaps it is not necessary for a representationalist to claim that the mind has indubita-
ble knowledge of its own ideas or objects which are somehow internal to consciousness 
but it is unclear to me why anyone would bother with a representationalist epistemology 
were there not some such guarantee regarding the inner sanctum. 
ix  Differences within representationalism may depend upon whether or not ideas them-
selves are regarded as the intermediate objects of perception and knowledge or as acts 
directed at distinct objects (e.g., sense data). See Hoffman (2002) for five ways of draw-
ing the distinction between direct and representational realism. But I assume that any 
theory of representationalism will be committed to something like these three proposi-
tions. 
x  See Hoffman (2002), 165-167. For a detailed account of Hoffman’s Thomistic reading 
of Descartes Hoffman (1996). 
xi  See ST. I, q. 85, a. 2. 
xii  Ibid., I. q. 85, a. 2. 
xiii  See Normore (1986), Tachau (1988) and Read (1977). 
xiv  Peter Aureol, Scriptum in I Sentarium, lat. 329. d.3, s.14, a.1; II:696. See Tachau’s dis-
cussion (1988), 89-100. 
xv  William of Ockham, Ordinatio, 274 
xvi  Stephen Read notes that once the notion of objective existence caught on it dominated 
the discussion about universals for two decades and had the additional benefit of provid-
ing a point of reference for the idea of “existing in the understanding” in Anselm’s On-
tological Argument. See Read (1977), 20. 
xvii  Walter Chatton, Lectura I d3 a2, quoted in Gal (1967), 202-3. 
xviii  Ockham, Summa Logicae, III. 2. c.29, lin. 14-22: “Non quod isti conceptus praecedant 
notitiam intuitivam hominis, sed iste est processus quod primo homo cognoscitur aliquo 
sensu particulari, deinde ille idem homo cognoscitur ab intellectu, quo cognito habetur 
una notitia generalis et communis omni homini. Et ista cognitio vocatur conceptus, in-
tentio, passio, qui conceptus communis est omni homini; quo existente in intellectu sta-
tim intellectus scit quod homo est aliquid, sine discursu. Deinde apprehenso alio animali 
ab homine vel aliis animalibus, elicitur una notitia generalis omni animali, et illa notitia 
generalis omni animali vocatur passio seu intentio animae sive conceptus communis 
omni animali.” 
xix  Francisco Suarez, Disputationes metaphysicae, 25, 1, 32. 
xx  Peculiar because, again, Aquinas does not use the terminology which suggests that de-
spite Brentano’s famous assertion that he derives the notion from the Scholastics, it was 
Objective Being in Descartes 151
 
Descartes’ use (on which Brentano frequently lectured) which was more influential on 
Brentano and thus the modern tradition. See Brown (2000). 
xxi  See Brentano (1874/1973), 332. 
xxii  See Gibson (1932), 79. 
xxiii  See Hoffman (2002), 176. 
xxiv  See ST, I, q. 86, a.1 
xxv  See Normore (1986). 
xxvi  See Wilson, Descartes (1978), 102. 
xxvii  Ibid., 106. 
xxviii  See Brown and Normore (2002). 
xxix  See Wilson (1978), 111. 
xxx  Ibid., 112. 
xxxi  O’Neil raises this as a general worry for objective existence theories but does not ex-
plore how it might be solved within such theories. O’Neil (1974), 10. 
xxxii  See Descartes’ Les Passions de l’Ame, a.23; AT XI, 346. 
xxxiii  Compare Nadler’s projectionist reading of Descartes and Arnauld (1989), 125-6. 
xxxiv  One might wonder whether it follows that all sensations are materially false. To 
this it might be objected that Descartes seems to allow for the possibility of materially 
true sensations, for example, the idea of heat if cold turns out to be a privation. (AT VII, 
44.) Descartes has, however, no way of ruling out that all sensations are materially false 
- at least nothing about a sensation tells us whether it is true or false - but if some are 
true, their truth could be accounted for by the presence of the material quality (e.g., heat) 
objectively in the idea. The epistemic shortcoming of confused and obscure ideas is not, 
as Wilson suggests, that they fail to wear their objective reality on their face but that 
they fail to wear their material falsity on their face. 
xxxv  Ibid., a.27; AT XI, 349. 
xxxvi  I would like to thank my friends in the Inter-Nordic community of scholars work-
ing on medieval and early modern conceptions of mind (and honorary members of this 
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ticular, I am grateful to Lilli Alanen and Calvin Normore and to the participants and or-
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